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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Arnold Dean Anderson appeals from his conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine with a persistent violator enhancement. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state filed a complaint charging Anderson with possession of 
methamphetamine. (R., pp. 8-9. 1) The court appointed the public defender's 
office to represent Anderson. (R., p. 19.) Public Defender Marilyn B. Paul filed a 
discovery request on Anderson's behalf. (R., pp. 20-23.) Deputy Public 
Defender Trevor Misseldine represented Anderson at the preliminary hearing and 
at the arraignment, filed a motion for preparation of a transcript on Anderson's 
behalf, and moved to continue the trial. (R., pp. 29, 53, 70-71, 75-76.) At the 
hearing on the motion to continue the trial Anderson filed a pro se request for 
substitution of counsel, which the district court granted. (R., pp. 77-79; 9/16/13 
Tr.) 
Thereafter Chief Deputy Public Defender Benjamin P. Andersen filed a 
motion for bond reduction on Anderson's behalf and represented him at the 
hearing on that motion. (R., pp. 84, 86.) He also filed an objection to the state's 
proposed I.RE. 404(b) evidence and represented Anderson at hearings on that 
topic. (R., pp. 88, 90-92, 96.) At a hearing held October 21, 2013, the state 
1 The state ultimately charged Anderson with possession of methamphetamine 
with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp. 32-34.) 
1 
withdrew its notice of intent to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) evidence. (10/21/13 Tr., p. 
3, L. 23 - p. 4, L. 1.) Benjamin Andersen then stated: 
I am having difficulties with Mr. Anderson with wanting to 
speak with me. He keeps telling me he wants to represent himself. I 
told him he'd be able to address that today.[2] I did speak with Mr. 
Fuller, Greg Fuller, who was looking at substituting in, so there may 
be a resolution to that. But I bring that to the Court's attention 
because it is causing some difficulty preparing for trial. 
(10/21/13 Tr., p. 4, L. 20 - p. 5, L. 2.) The court responded by suggesting that 
the matter be addressed during "Friday's 11:00 docket." (10/21/13 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 
11-15.) Benjamin Andersen stated he would "try to figure out what's going on" 
regarding Anderson's representation before that time. (10/21/13 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 16-
17.) The district court then stated that it wanted to "get that issue addressed" 
because "[i]f he wants to represent himself, that's his choice." (10/21/13 Tr., p. 5, 
Ls. 18-20.) 
The case was not taken up that Friday as discussed, but was taken up the 
next Monday, October 28, 2013. (R., p. 98; 10/28/13 Tr.3) Atthat time Anderson 
told the district court that he had asked Douglas Nelson to represent him, and Mr. 
Nelson had informed Anderson he could take the case if Anderson could get the 
trial postponed. (10/28/13 Tr., p. 7, L. 25 - p. 8, L. 4.) The district court, in 
deference to the defendant's right to be represented by counsel of his own 
2 Anderson was not present at the hearing. (10/21/13 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 12-14.) 
3 Although the record does not reflect why the case was not taken up on Friday, 
October 25, 2013, the state notes that a pre-trial conference had previously been 
scheduled for October 28, 2013. (R., p. 95.) The inference is that the district 
court elected to hear the concerns raised at the October 21, 2013 hearing at the 
already scheduled October 28 pre-trial conference rather than on October 25. 
2 
choice, stated, "If I receive appearance from Mr. Nelson, if I receive a motion to 
vacate this trial, and if I receive a speedy trial waiver, I will vacate [the trial]." 
(10/28/13 Tr., p. 8, L. 20 - p. 9, L. 16.) Anderson agreed to proceeding on this 
basis. (10/28/13 Tr. p. 9, L. 17 - p. 10, L. 1.) Shortly thereafter Anderson filed a 
waiver of speedy trial, a substitution of Douglas Nelson for Benjamin Andersen 
as Anderson's attorney, and a motion to continue the trial. (R., pp. 99, 102, 108.) 
The district court granted the motion to continue the trial. (R., p. 110.) 
The matter proceeded to jury trial, where Anderson was represented by 
Mr. Nelson. (R., pp. 134-38.) The jury found Anderson guilty. (R., p. 167.) 
The court scheduled the sentencing hearing for March 24, 2014. (R., p. 
171.) On March 17, 2014, Anderson filed prose a document entitled "On I.C.R. 
35 Motion correction or reduction of sentence oral argument," wherein Anderson 
claimed multiple errors in the case, but did not claim ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel, Mr. Nelson. (R., pp. 189-231.4) The matter proceeded to the scheduled 
sentencing hearing. (R., p. 275; 3/24/14 Tr.) After receiving the evidence but 
before argument the court pointed out that it had received Anderson's pro se 
Rule 35 motion. (3/24/14 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 9-19.) Mr. Nelson asked for a 
continuance of the rest of the sentencing hearing to consult with Anderson about 
the issues he had raised or may have wanted to raise with that motion. (3/24/14 
Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-25.) The court granted the continuance and set the rest of the 
4 Anderson did claim errors by attorney Benjamin Andersen, who represented 
him before the trial. (R., pp. 190-91.) 
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sentencing hearing four days later. (3/24/14 Tr., p. 14, L. 5 - p. 15, L. 6; R., p. 
276.) 
Two days before the sentencing resumed Anderson filed a prose motion 
to dismiss Mr. Nelson, claiming he was ineffective at trial. (R., pp. 277-80.) 
Counsel then filed a motion to withdraw and requested the motion be heard at 
the sentencing scheduled the next day. (R., pp. 282, 284.) At the sentencing 
hearing the court engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Anderson regarding what he 
wished to do at the sentencing hearing. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 7, L. 1 - p. 11, L. 7.) 
Anderson ultimately stated he did not wish to represent himself but wanted to be 
represented by "the public defender ... or conflict attorney." (3/28/14 Tr., p. 11, 
Ls. 2-7.) The district court denied that request. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 22 - p. 13, 
L. 6.) 
The district court sentenced Anderson to 12 years with four years fixed. 
(R., pp. 288-91.) Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 299-300.) 
4 
ISSUES 
Anderson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Anderson's rights under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, 
§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution, and Idaho Code §§ 19-106 
and 19-857, when it ignored his request to be heard 
regarding his desire to represent himself at trial? 
2. Did the district court err when it failed to conduct a sufficient 
inquiry of Mr. Anderson and his trial counsel upon Mr. 
Anderson's request for substitute counsel, and when it failed 
to appoint substitute counsel for Mr. Anderson? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an 
excessive sentence upon Mr. Anderson in light of the 
mitigating factors that exist in this case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Is Anderson's claim that the district court should have inquired of him 
about his desires regarding counsel at the October 21, 2013 pre-trial 
conference frivolous because he was not present at that pre-trial 
conference? 
2. Has Anderson failed to show that the record establishes a conflict of 
interests sufficient to trigger the district court's duty of inquiry? 





Anderson's Claim That The District Court Should Have Inquired Of Him At The 
October 21, 2013 Pre-Trial Conference Is Frivolous Because He Was Not 
Present 
The appellant "bears the burden of demonstrating error through the 
record." State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009); see 
also Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145, 158 P.3d 305, 308 (2007) ("On appeal, 
the party challenging the decision below has the burden of showing error in the 
record."). A claim on appeal based on a misrepresentation of the record is 
frivolous. Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 371, 209 P.3d 661, 668 (2009) 
(imposing sanctions for basing claim on misrepresentation of the record). 
Anderson claims that he made a request for self-representation that the district 
court simply ignored. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-9.) Anderson's claim the district 
court erred by not inquiring of him is frivolous because it is premised entirely 
upon a misrepresentation of the record. 
The record shows that, at the October 21, 2013 pre-trial conference at 
which Anderson was not present (10/21/13 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 12-14), Anderson's 
counsel informed the court that Anderson may desire to either represent himself 
or be represented by substitute counsel (10/21/13 Tr., p. 4, L. 20 - p. 5, L. 17). 
The district court decided to take that matter up with Anderson present. 
(10/21/13 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 11-17.) The district court specifically stated that Anderson 
could represent himself if he wished. (10/21/13 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 18-20.) 
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At the next hearing, on October 28, 2013, Anderson, who was present, 
stated that he wished to be represented by Douglas Nelson, and the district court 
granted that motion. (10/28/13 Tr., p. 6, L. 10-p. 10, L. 1.) 
Anderson's claim that he made a request to the district court to represent 
himself is false. His counsel informed the court that Anderson had so told him, 
but when Anderson was physically brought before the court he requested to be 
represented by a certain attorney, and the court granted his request. Anderson's 
claim of error is based on a misrepresentation of the record and is thus frivolous. 
11. 
The District Court Was Not Required To Conduct Further Inquiry Because The 
Record Does Not Show The Court Knew Or Should Have Known Of Any Conflict 
A. Introduction 
After the start of the sentencing hearing the district court granted Mr. 
Nelson's request to set over the remainder of the hearing so he could consult 
with Anderson regarding a pro se filing by Anderson that counsel had not seen. 
(3/24/14 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-25; p. 14, L. 4 - p. 15, L. 6.) Before the sentencing 
resumed Anderson filed a motion for new counsel claiming Mr. Nelson had been 
ineffective at the trial. (R., pp 277-80.) The district court denied that request, 
finding that the only remaining task in the case was a sentencing argument and 
that Anderson's repeated complaints about multiple attorneys in multiple cases 
resulting in significant delays showed that Anderson was merely manipulating the 
system. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 22- p. 13, L. 6.) 
On appeal Anderson asserts the trial court should have conducted further 
inquiry into why he wished to substitute counsel and should have granted the 
7 
request for substitute counsel based on the information provided. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 9-19.) Review of the record shows that Anderson's complaints about 
Mr. Nelson were presented most fully, and application of the correct legal 
standards shows that Anderson's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by 
Mr. Nelson at trial were rightly rejected as grounds for substitution of counsel in 
the middle of sentencing. 
B. Anderson's Claims Were Fully Developed Below And Were Legally 
Inadequate To Show Counsel Was Actually Affected By A Conflict Of 
Interests Or Was Otherwise Constitutionally Ineffective 
"In order to ensure that a defendant receives conflict-free counsel, a trial 
court has an affirmative duty to inquire into a potential conflict whenever it knows 
or reasonably should know that a particular conflict may exist." State v. 
Skunkcap, 157 Idaho 221, _, 335 P.3d 561, 577 (2014) (quotations omitted). 
An actual conflict of interest exists only where conflicting interests "actually 
affected the adequacy of [counsel's] representation." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 
U.S. 162, 171-72 (2001) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); 
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 481-82 (1978)). Thus far the Supreme 
Court of the United States has not required inquiry into potential conflicts outside 
the context of "multiple concurrent representation." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175-76 
(whether requirement for judicial inquiry into potential conflicts applies outside 
context of multiple concurrent representation is an "open question" in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence). 
The record shows that Anderson set forth his grounds for wanting 
substitute counsel in great detail. He asserted his trial counsel, Mr. Nelson, was 
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ineffective for failing to interview certain witnesses, call certain witnesses, use 
certain photos as exhibits, conduct certain discovery, demonstrate that the 
state's evidence had been fabricated or altered, object to testimony, obtain 
evidence from prior counsel, and conduct certain cross-examination. (R., pp. 
277-280.) At the hearing Anderson also stated several complaints about his prior 
counsel, Benjamin Andersen. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 7, L. 1 - p. 11, L. 7.) It is plain on 
this record that Anderson was dissatisfied with the way current counsel 
conducted the trial and with how prior counsel had conducted the case before 
trial. Further inquiry into the grounds for Anderson's request for substitute 
counsel was not required, and would have been pointless. 
Furthermore, Anderson's clearly stated dissatisfaction with the way Mr. 
Nelson had handled the trial did not demonstrate or raise even the possibility that 
Mr. Nelson was actively representing conflicting interests at sentencing. "The 
mere lack of confidence in an otherwise competent counsel is not grounds for the 
appointment of substitute counsel." Skunkcap, 157 Idaho at _, 335 P.3d at 
577. The evidence for sentencing had been presented and the only thing left to 
do was present recommendations and argument. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 3-16.) 
Counsel represented on the record that he was ready to proceed with the rest of 
the sentencing. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 11, L. 22 - p. 12, L. 2.) Anderson's expressed 
dissatisfaction with the way counsel conducted the trial did not create any conflict 
of interests or other constitutional deficiency by counsel during sentencing. 
In claiming error, Anderson cites several cases for the proposition that an 
indigent defendant with appointed counsel may make a motion for substitute 
9 
counsel and must be adequately heard on that motion, and that substitute 
counsel may be appointed upon a showing of "good cause." (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 12-19.5) Those cases, however, and the "good cause" standard they apply, 
arise from I.C. § 19-856 (2004). See State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 
P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980); State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, 594, 181 P.3d 512, 520 
(Ct. App. 2007); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. 
App. 1997); see also State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 714-15, 52 P.3d 857, 859-60 
(2002) (relying on Clayton and Peck). That statute, however, was repealed by 
the legislature, effective July 1, 2013. I.C. § 19-856 (2014 cumulative supp.) It 
thus has no application to Anderson's March 26, 2014 motion. (R., p. 277.) 
Because there is no statutory basis for his arguments, Anderson must 
assert and demonstrate a constitutional one. "Good cause" as established by 
repealed I.C. § 19-856 is not a constitutional standard. See United States v. 
Gonzalez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006) ("the right to counsel of choice does not 
extend to defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them"). As noted 
above, the constitution guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel, 
including the right to counsel that is not actively pursuing conflicting interests in a 
way that "actually affected the adequacy of his representation" or "influenced ... 
his basic strategic decisions." Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171-72 (emphasis original, 
quotes omitted). Anderson's claims of dissatisfaction are simply not 
constitutionally significant. 
5 Anderson cites cases generally regarding his constitutional right to counsel, but 
cites no relevant constitutional standards applicable to the proceedings in this 
case. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
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Because Anderson has failed to show any constitutional claim, and 
because his statutory claim is based on a repealed statute, he has failed to show 
error by the district court. 
111. 
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
The district court sentenced Anderson to 12 years with four years fixed for 
possession of methamphetamine with a persistent violator enhancement, 
concurrent with a prior sentence. (R., pp. 288-91.) The judge's stated goal was 
to add one year fixed and one year indeterminate to the time Anderson was 
already required to serve on the prior sentence. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 22, L. 16 - p. 23, 
L. 22.) 
Anderson argues the court erred by not finding him amenable to 
rehabilitation in the community and not giving more weight to what he deems to 
be mitigating factors. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20.) At sentencing the district 
court specifically rejected the claim that Anderson had rehabilitation potential, 
because this is his eighth felony; he has "a ton of misdemeanor offenses"; his 
criminal history "goes back well over 20 years"; and Anderson committed this 
offense while felony drug charges in another case were pending. (3/28/14 Tr., p. 
18, L. 25 - p. 19, L. 15.) Furthermore, the district court concluded that the 
evidence showed that Anderson was not only a drug user, but was distributing 
drugs in the community and was "not accepting responsibility for wanting to 
change his life." (3/28/14 Tr., p. 19, Ls. 16-23.) Anderson has failed to show any 
abuse of discretion. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
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